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THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM WITH DRONES
Frédéric Mégret*
Abstract
One of the difficulties with the debate on drones is that it has
become a sort of lightning rod for all kinds of anxieties about the use of
force in today’s world. Drones are, often problematically, the
emblematic weapon for a range of other phenomena, and unsurprisingly,
attract much polemic. The challenge, therefore, is to find the specific
problem with drones as a technology in armed conflict that could not be
dealt with better by invoking a larger genus of problems. To do this, this
Article outlines ways in which drones have been seen as problematic,
which this Article argues are either not specifically humanitarian or are
really dealing with something else such as what the legal framework
applicable to the War on Terror should be. Separating these very
important debates from the humanitarian questions about drones is
crucial to making conceptual headway. This Article then examines
whether drones have any specific or inherent characteristics that other
weapons lack and addresses whether one such characteristic is a drone’s
ability to cause unwarranted harm to civilians. It seeks to explain how,
regardless of the answer to that complicated question, drones are much
more likely to be perceived as inflicting excessive damage due to their
highly discriminatory potential but also, crucially, the way in which they
maximize the safety of the drone operator. Drones’ unique ability to
ensure the absolute safety of the operator not only maximizes States’
ability to minimize collateral harm, as has already been observed
elsewhere, but also has the potential to fundamentally alter the laws of
war’s tolerance for collateral harm, which it is argued was always based
on the assumption of a tradeoff between harm to the attacker and to
“enemy civilians”—a tradeoff that has now been rendered moot.
Moreover the one-sidedness of drone warfare in many cases goes to the
heart of the humanitarian compact in that it makes one side to a conflict
entirely vulnerable to the other. The Article then attempts to
contextualize the drone problem within a larger history of exogenous
technological shock to international humanitarian law. It finishes with a
reflection on how anomalous drone warfare is, and in particular whether
it manifests a radical novelty or reconnects with old themes already
evident in colonial warfare. Overall, the Article is interested in
determining not so much whether drone use may or may not be “legal,”
than more broadly, how it impacts some of the moral underpinnings of
the laws of war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article begins with a puzzle: drone attacks seem to elicit very strong
reactions, yet from a humanitarian point of view, they might seem relatively
innocuous as weapons—or at least not markedly more nefarious than a range of
other weapons that seem largely tolerated. In fact, drones might seem to be the
epitome of modern, surgical, and humanitarian weapons considering their ability to
hover above very specific enemy targets, their ability to get far closer than manned
aircrafts, and their high precision engagement capability. So why the strong
reaction? How can we make sense of the indignation? Is it based on a
misapprehension that civilian casualties are always wrong, or does it denote some
so far inchoate moral or juridical intuition that needs to be better formulated? This
is not to suggest that the reaction is necessarily wrong—it is, after all, genuine, and
there are sound reasons to at least listen to our moral intuitions—but instead to
suggest that it is not quite clear why well-intentioned humanitarians have a
problem with drones. In an effort to move beyond the gut reaction to some uses of
drones, this Article proposes a theory of what is problematic with drones from a
humanitarian point of view that seeks to reformulate some of the indignation that
drones provoke from within an understanding of the historical role of the laws of
war.
This Article will only deal with drones that are piloted by humans, and will
not deal with the issue of robotization.1 The issue of robotization is alive in the
humanitarian debate but it is quite different, broader, and probably more complex
than the issue of drones alone. Drones do raise interesting issues in and of
themselves. This Article defines drones as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
particularly those with the ability to deliver lethal force. Drones have become a
central instrument in armed conflict, and an increasing number of States and even
nonstate actors have deployed them in some way or other—although Western
armies clearly have a significant technological advance in that respect.
Moreover, this Article is only interested in the humanitarian problem raised
by drones. “Humanitarian” in this Article means those concerns born from the
* © 2013 Frédéric Mégret. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University
Canada Research Chair in the Law of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Centre for
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism.
1
This has now become a vast, separate field that raises immense questions that are far
beyond the limited scope of this Article. See generally RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING
LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009); W.J. SMUDA ET AL., U.S. ARMY,
ROBOTS AT WAR—EXPERIENCES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2004), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a432400.pdf; Colln Allen et al., Robots at War, 33
WILSON Q. 6 (2009); Christian Caryl, Predators and Robots at War, 58 N.Y. REV. BOOKS
55 (2011) (reviewing MATT J. MARTIN & CHALES W. SASSER, PREDATOR: THE REMOTECONTROL AIR WAR OVER IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: A PILOT’S STORY (2010); P.W. SINGER,
WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2009)); Noel Sharkey, Saying “No!” to Lethal Autonomous Targeting, 9 J. MIL.
ETHICS 369 (2010); Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007).
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application of the laws of war—or international humanitarian law—about the
particular lethality of drones in armed conflict, most notably how the lethality of
drones affects non-combatants including, first and foremost, civilians. Of course,
this definition presumes that (i) international humanitarian law is indeed the
applicable framework because there is an armed conflict and the use of a drone
occurs as part of that armed conflict, (ii) issues of modalities of the use of force
can be distinguished from issues of resort to force, and (iii) the uses of drones are
not so radically new as to demand a paradigm shift away from international
humanitarian law. This Article will return to how these assumptions can be
challenged. It is sufficient at this stage to accept that they hold true at least some of
the time. The Article therefore asks the reader to imagine cases where drones are
being used in an armed conflict between identified participants. In addition, unless
otherwise indicated, this Article will focus on the law of international armed
conflict, leaving aside non-international armed conflicts, because it is the most
developed, and therefore most useful when thinking about how drones might
change the nature of warfare. It is important to note that the issue of the
humanitarian significance of drones in armed conflict is not necessarily the one
that has attracted the most attention, 2 and may indeed not be the most
controversial,3 although that certainly does not vitiate its importance. This Article
2

Although this has arguably begun to change, the literature on the humanitarian
implications of drones is relatively small compared to its broader association with the war
on terror, or implications for the jus ad bellum. The following pieces are broadly interested
in the same type of inquiry as this Article: Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era,
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409 (2009); Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes
Impact the Law of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2012); Aaron M. Drake, Current U.S.
Air Force Drone Operations and Their Conduct in Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law—An Overview, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 629 (2011); Hyder
Gulam & Simon Lee, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict,
3 AUSTL. ARMY J. 123 (2006); Meredith Hagger & Tim McCormack, Regulating the Use
of Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General Principles of International Humanitarian
Law Sufficient?, J.L. INFO. & SCI., 2011/2012, at 74; Chris Jenks, Law from Above:
Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV.
649 (2009); Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International
Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 595 (2012);
Naureen Shah, Human Rights Inst., Columbia Univ., Introductory Remarks to Targeting
with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications (Mar. 25, 2011), in 105 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 233, 233–35, 244–45 (2011); Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the
Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101 (2010); John J. Klein, The
Problematic Nexus: Where Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict
Meet, CHRONS. ONLINE J. (July 22, 2003), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicl
es/cc/klein.html.
3
Hagger & McCormack, supra note 2, at 75 (“[T]he principal focus of concern is not
generally on military utilisation of the technology in the theatre of combat operations.
Rather, of much greater concern are covert targeted killing programs which currently
appear to operate beyond the law with a complete absence of transparency and
accountability.”).
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has therefore deliberately chosen to deal not with what is wrong with the actual use
of drones in a variety of settings, but instead discusses the peculiar intersection of
drone warfare with the body of law designed to regulate warfare.
The debate on drones has become a sort of lightning rod for all kinds of
anxieties about the use of force in today’s world: the so-called War on Terror,
virtualization of war, robotization of war, privatization of war, the executivization
of war, and so on.4 Drones are, often problematically, the emblematic weapon for a
range of such phenomena and so, unsurprisingly, they attract much polemic.
Because all of these issues are often blended together, some confusion arises. The
challenge, thus, is to find what is problematic specifically with drones as a
technology in armed conflict that could not be dealt with better by invoking a
larger genus of problems. Part II begins the Article by outlining a series of ways in
which drones have been seen as problematic, which it argues are either not
specifically humanitarian or are something else entirely—such as what the legal
framework applicable to the war on terror should be. Separating these very
important debates from the humanitarian questions that ought to be asked about
drones as such is crucial if one is to make conceptual headway. Part III will then
examine the issue of whether there is anything that is specific or inherent to drones
that makes them unique from other weapons. Part IV addresses the question of
whether that might be why drones cause unwarranted harm to civilians. Part V
seeks to explain how, regardless of the answer to that complicated question, drones
are much more likely to be perceived as inflicting excessive damage due to their
highly discriminatory potential. It also seeks to explain the way in which drones
maximize the safety of the drone operator. Part VI argues that this absolute safety
of the operator, which is arguably what is most unique about drones, not only
maximizes States’ ability to minimize collateral harm but also has the potential to
fundamentally alter what should be the laws of war’s tolerance for collateral harm.
Part VII attempts to contextualize the drone problem within a larger history of
exogenous technological shock to international humanitarian law and how it has
addressed them. Overall, the Article attempts to determine whether drone use may
or may not be “legal,” and more broadly how it impacts some of the moral
underpinnings of the laws of war.

4

See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 1, at 6 (noting the ethical risks of robots carrying
lethal weapons); Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77 (2010) (addressing the legality of drones in a war on terrorism);
Sharkey, supra note 1, at 370 (explaining the “ethical concerns about the application of
armed robots in areas with mixed combatant and civilian populations”); Sparrow, supra
note 1, at 62 (considering “the ethics of a decision to send artificially intelligent robots into
war”).
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II. THE VARIEGATED NATURE OF THE DRONE DEBATE
A. Nonhumanitarian Issues Raised by Drones
The international legal regime on the use of force covers both issues of jus ad
bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (the way war ought to be waged).
Only the latter addresses specifically humanitarian issues, but it is unclear whether
those humanitarian issues have been at the forefront of the concerns about drones.
This section will outline several ways in which the debate on drones often does not
focus specifically on humanitarian problems, in an effort to set the stage for the
next section.
Drones have become the emblematic weapon of the so-called War on Terror
and what are, in the minds of many international and human rights lawyers, some
of its excesses. 5 In that respect, the drone debate has merely replicated, in
condensed form, some of the debates that have agitated international lawyers for
the better part of the last decade, with little in the way of an outcome. Among those
is the notion that the war against terror is waged anywhere in the world where
“terrorist targets” exist, even if that means in some cases intruding on the
sovereignty of foreign States.6 This, however, points to a jus ad bellum problem in
the sense that drones arguably provide a way to conduct a form of limited and
clandestine warfare in violation of international law that would not be possible
with conventional troops. Drone warfare may qualify as a form of aggression in
some cases. Be that as it may, this is an altogether different issue than the
humanitarian one that this Article is interested in, and not necessarily the one that
drone opponents are most incensed about. 7 The fact that drones are used in
violation of the jus ad bellum does not tell us whether they are used in violation of
the jus in bello.
Another series of more domestic and constitutional concerns about drones
also fails to capture any sense of their humanitarian specificity.8 For example, the
idea that drones allow governments to conduct war without the sort of legislative

5

See Bruce Cronin, Reckless Endangerment Warfare: Civilian Casualties and the
Collateral Damage Exception in International Humanitarian Law, 50 J. PEACE RES. 175,
182 (2013); John Prados, The Continuing Quandary of Covert Operations, 5 J. NAT’L SEC.
L. & POL’Y 359, 372 (2012).
6
See Daniel Brunstetter & Megan Braun, The Implications of Drones on the Just War
Tradition, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 337, 346–47 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks:
The Resort to Drones Under International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 592–93
(2011).
7
Although in practice and theory the two mix, it is often clear that public opinions are
more incensed by civilian casualties in Waziristan, for example, than by violations of
Pakistani sovereignty.
8
See Jamie L. Kleidman, The Constitutionality of the Predator Drone Program, 4
VIENNA ONLINE J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 359 (2010) (analyzing whether the drone program is
constitutional without considering humanitarian arguments).
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scrutiny that might come with the use of conventional forces,9 that they represent a
highly abnormal form of executive overreach,10 that they displace the operation of
the judiciary, 11 and are otherwise damaging to democracy 12 are all interesting
points, but these ideas are not a part of a humanitarian argument.13 The same is true
of the critique of drones as used “outside the military chain of command,”14 for
example by intelligence agencies.15 This is undeniably a problem and it should be a
reason to question the circumventing of the military and normal democratic
scrutiny, but there is nothing that says that drones are more likely to be used in
non-humanitarian ways merely because actors other than the army operate them. A
similar argument can be made in relation to the critique that drone manipulation is
at times outsourced to private companies. 16 In that case the dispute is with
privatization of lethal force in general not with privatization of drones in particular,
which is then only a facet of a much broader problem. All of these arguments made
in the drone context, in short, are not about drones per se, but about the way drones
have become emblematic of some deeper problem that is better tackled as such. An
9

See John Patera, War Powers Resolution in the Age of Drone Warfare: How Drone
Technology Has Dramatically Reduced the Resolution’s Effectiveness as a Curb on
Executive Power, 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 387, 404–05 (2012).
10
John E. Owens & Mark Shephard, From 9/11 to 2011: The ‘War on Terror’ and the
Onward March of Executive Power?, in THE LEGACY OF THE CRASH 221, 228–29
(Terrence Casey ed., 2011).
11
See Carla Crandall, Ready . . . Fire . . . Aim! A Case for Applying American Due
Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. INT’L L. 55, 58 (2012);
Michael Epstein, The Curious Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi: Is Targeting a Terrorist for
Execution by Drone Strike a Due Process Violation When the Terrorist Is a United States
Citizen?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 723 (2011); Nat Hentoff, British Courts to Decide U.S.
Drones Do Murder?, CATO INST. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/comme
ntary/british-courts-decide-us-drones-do-murder; Nat Hentoff, With Presidential Drones,
Who Needs Judges?, CATO INST. (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.cato.org/publications/comm
entary/presidential-drones-who-needs-judges.
12
Frank Sauer & Niklas Schörnig, Killer Drones: The ‘Silver Bullet’ of Democratic
Warfare?, 43 SEC. DIALOGUE 363, 365, 371–75 (2012).
13
Except perhaps in the distant sense that armies are less likely to feel accountable
under the jus in bello if there is no democratic exposure of some of the violations they
commit, or perhaps in the very indirect sense that a democracy that wantonly violates the
laws of war corrupts itself.
14
Navi Pillay, US Drone Strikes ‘Raise Questions,’ BBC NEWS (June 8, 2012, 4:28
ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18363003.
15
Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones, 13
Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 133, 133 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing
with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE
LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144; Brian Glyn Williams, The CIA’s Covert Predator
Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign, 33 STUD.
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 871 (2010).
16
Jeremy Scahill, The Secret War in Pakistan: U.S. Special Forces Enlist
Blackwater’s Help on Covert Operations, NATION, Dec. 21, 2009, at 11.
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important step in understanding the confusion surrounding drones is a realization
that much of the uneasiness about drones is in fact uneasiness about things of
which drones are only a small part.
B. The Legal Framework Issue
One issue that has proved a perennial distraction is the issue of the legal
framework under which drone strikes operate.17 For better or for worse this has
been linked to one of the biggest questions to bedevil international law in the last
decade, namely what use of force norms apply to the War on Terror 18 —the
background to most actual drone uses. This is to the point that many debates that
purport to be about drones are actually about (i) which framework applies to the
War on Terror, and (ii) how that “war” should be fought. Some of the larger
questions raised in this context will inevitably have to be resolved even beyond the
particular scenario of fighting Al-Qaeda—and its spinoffs—and extend to a variety
of asymmetrical conflicts. There are essentially three big contenders to this issue,
all problematic internally and in relation to each other: (i) the laws of war, (ii)
international human rights law/law enforcement, and (iii) a more loosely defined
international law of self-defense/national security. To make matters more
complicated, these three do not all operate at the same level. The first is only
interested in means. The second is potentially interested in both ends and means.
And some would argue that the third is both a justification for the use of force and
its own code as to how to inflict it.19 Finally, there may be an interest on the part of
some actors in simultaneously invoking several of these frameworks depending on
either changing circumstances or some instrumental justification.20
Still, perhaps the most popular model to think about the War on Terror has
been the laws of war. These can provide an interesting starting point. If the laws of
war do apply to the war on terror, then all kinds of questions arise that are pertinent
to drone use. 21 Such questions include the difficulties of ascertaining who is a

17

Jenks, supra note 2, at 651–52.
Adam Roberts, Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War, SURVIVAL,
Spring 2002, at 7.
19
This is what is sometimes known as the robust approach to self-defense. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
20
For a critique of that trend, see Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The
Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1655 (2012).
21
See, e.g., Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., A Qualified Defense of American Drone Attacks
in Northwest Pakistan Under International Humanitarian Law, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 409, 413
(2012) (explaining that the technological advances in weaponry “raise practical questions
regarding accessibility and control, as well as normative questions related to how and when
the use of such weapons is acceptable, if ever”).
18
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combatant and who is not in such a fluid type of armed conflict,22 as well as the
potentially limitless geographical and temporal scope of that armed conflict.23 In
fact, under the guise of studying drones and the laws of war, much of the literature
is, effectively, using drone policy as a way of interrogating some of the
complexities associated with the waging of the war on terror.24 If the laws of war
do not apply to the war on terror—or do not apply in all cases where drones are
used—two avenues open, depending on what is seen as the default regime
internationally. At one end of the spectrum, many argue that international human
rights/criminal law should be the applicable paradigm. 25 In that case, as Philip
Alston, the UN Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions and the author of a widely
influential report on the question quickly pointed out, one is in a situation where it
will often be difficult to distinguish drone attacks from a particularly malign form
of extraterritorial and extrajudicial use of lethal force, amounting perhaps even to
an arbitrary execution in violation of the right to life.26 At the other end of the
spectrum there are those who would argue that the targeting of terrorists falls under
a broad self-defense or national security regime that provides a fundamental
legitimacy for striking with drones and essentially makes it possible to do away
with the finer details of human rights or humanitarian law.27
There is no doubt that the issue of the relevant legal framework is an
important, even all-defining one. It is, in fact, perhaps the most important issue
22

Naureen Shah, Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law
Implications 13–14 (March 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832755; Vogel, supra note 2, at 116–18.
23
Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and
Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 1 (2010); Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47
TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 299–301 (2011); Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global
Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 65 (2013); Frédéric Mégret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L
L. REV. 131 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 845 (2008).
24
See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 23.
25
See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 15.
26
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 32–33, 85, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) (pointing out that an “intentional, premeditated and
deliberate killing . . . cannot be legal because, unlike in armed conflict, it is never
permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation” and that “outside the
context of an armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to
be legal”).
27
For a critical discussion of that paradigm after 9/11, see Theresa Reinold, State
Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L.
244 (2011); see also Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and
Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171 (2003); Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on
Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone
Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77 (2010).
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confronting the international law of the use of force in this day and age. It is not
the one that this Article is interested in, however, for at least three reasons. First,
the debate effectively raises questions less about drones per se than about the
particular legal paradigm under which these happen to be used and in particular
whether the laws of war should apply.28 There is of course no shortage of reasons
why the laws of war might not apply to the war on terror, or at least to the entirety
of that broad phenomenon as it was loosely defined in the wake of 9/11 by the
Bush administration.29 To sum up a very long and complicated debate, there has
always been an argument that the war on terror is not an actual armed conflict in
the sense understood by the laws of war (or indeed the jus ad bellum)30 in that it
targets groups and individuals that cannot be said to meaningfully engage in an
“armed conflict” with the United States.31 Even if some individuals are engaged in
such an armed conflict, there is a regrettable tendency of the war-on-terror
paradigm being deployed to cover all kinds of situations in which individuals
cannot be connected to an actual battlefield. But if one’s issue is with the war on
terror’s global reach, then it is more coherent intellectually to discuss that (i.e.,
whether an actual war is going on) rather than what happens to be one of that war’s
weapons of choice. There is a risk otherwise that one will confuse the tool and the
policy, where clearly the policy is where the debate lies.
Second, once one has decided that the human rights or the selfdefense/national security paradigms apply to drones, the issue of whether a drone
attack is legal or not is, in many ways, fairly simple: it is clearly not legal in the
former case and legal in the latter. A weapon that leaves very little chance of
survival to the target is unlikely to pass the onerous test of human rights law that
loss of life is only justifiable as a result of reasonable use of force in the pursuit of
a lawful arrest; conversely it will easily pass the test under the selfdefense/national security framework, which is relatively indifferent to means used
on account of the significance of the goal and has long justified covert violent
28

Andrew C. Orr, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of
American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 729,
735 (2011).
29
Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the “Global War on
Terrorism,” 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 165, 169 (2005).
30
Frédéric Mégret, ‘War’? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 361, 362–63 (2002).
31
There are several reasons why, despite their clear hostility to American interests, it
is not clear that an armed conflict, as understood by the Geneva Conventions, has actually
arisen. These include the fact that terrorists are not in a position to engage in a sustained
level of hostilities with the United States (as opposed to striking U.S. interests at very
irregular intervals), that their very inability and unwillingness to engage in actual warfare
disqualifies the idea that one can be engaged in armed hostilities (as the term is normally
understood) with them, and that the United States itself by its behavior—and here, surely,
acts speak louder than words—has belied any notion that it is actually fighting a war (most
notably by denying those captured as part of the war on terror, including in conditions very
close to those of a battlefield, both prisoner-of-war status and the privilege of belligerency).
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action. Only under a humanitarian framework do potentially more complex
questions arise when weighing different and competing goals. Although most
authors in fact see the problem with drones as emanating largely from situations
outside the operation of international humanitarian law,32 this Article argues that
even in uncontroversial situations of armed conflict some questions need to be
addressed.
Third, whilst drones will often be used outside the framework of an actual
armed conflict despite the claims of the war on terror, there will also be plenty of
opportunities for them to be used in such conflicts. For example, even if the war on
terror is an unhelpful and misleading catchphrase, there will be cases where a
drone-resorting State is (i) actually fighting a State that supports terrorism or a
group supported by a State under the guise of fighting terrorism (e.g., the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001) or (ii) under the guise of fighting “global
terrorism” the State is actually fighting several particular terrorist groups as part of
a global noninternational armed conflict (Al-Qaeda in its various incarnations
globally). Moreover, there will be cases where a drone strike is sufficiently tied to
the pursuit of that armed conflict that it can be seen as part of the conflict and is
occurring within a clear laws-of-war “hot zone.” 33 At any rate, it is entirely
conceivable that drones will be used in conventional conflicts as well. Therefore,
the readers of this Article are asked to imagine a straightforward situation in which
drones are being used in actual armed conflict as understood in the laws of war. In
a sense, showing that drones raise challenging questions of law and morality even
in a fairly conventional armed-conflict setting, makes the debate even more
interesting.
II. DRONES, SPECIFICITY, AND “INHERENCY”
If we are to study drones as something more than a symptom of something
larger, two related inquiries seem required: (i) to find something that is specific to
drones that other weapons systems do not have, and (ii) to find something that is
inherent to drones that is arguably included in the very idea of drones regardless of
the circumstances in which they are deployed.

32

See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal
Operations, J.L. INFO. & SCI., 2011/2012, at 116, 122–33.
33
On the broad debate of where the laws of war might actually be held to apply
within the War on Terror, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National
Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675
(2004); Geoffrey S. Corn, Geography of Armed Conflict: Why It Is a Mistake to Fish for
the Red Herring, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 254 (2013); Lubell & Derejko, supra note 23; Kenneth
Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether There
Is a ‘Legal Geography of War,’ FUTURE CHALLENGES NAT’L SEC. & L. (April 2011),
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Anderson.pdf; see
also Jinks, supra note 29 (analyzing whether the rules of war under the Geneva
Conventions should apply to certain forms of hostilities).
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With regard to the question of specificity, it is quite clear that many
characteristics of drones are also present in other weapons systems, and therefore
would not seem to warrant, in and of themselves, the level of attention devoted to
drones. What is true of drones in the context of the war on terror will often be true
of a range of other means and methods of combat that might be deployed in that
context.34 For example, if the criticism is that drones can strike anywhere in the
world—even assuming that statement to be true—then it makes for a relatively
weak case for the normative peculiarity of drones. There are many weapons that
can strike with ruthless efficiency in far-flung locations.35 Similarly, the fact that
drones strike deep behind enemy lines in areas that are beyond verification of
casualties is hardly specific to drones and is not something that, from a
humanitarian point of view, should render drones less legal.36 Evidently drones
share many characteristics with two closely related weapons systems—planes and
missiles—having essentially fused the guidance ability of the former and the
unmanned character of the latter.
The challenge, at any rate, is to find what it is that makes drones sufficiently
different from other weapons that they raise sui generis issues—or at least a range
of familiar issues in new ways. A fundamental critique of drones—if there is to be
one—must be at least somewhat independent of the contexts in which drones are
used and must instead reach for something that is inherent about them—that is,
something that lies in their very nature. This Article is not interested in the separate
and more ambitious question of whether drones are inherently unlawful under the
laws of war. This would at any rate be a very ambitious claim to make. Drones
seem to be neither inherently indiscriminate, at least in the sense of being
“incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets,”37 nor doomed
to cause “unnecessary suffering” 38 any more than the various missiles and
ammunition they use. Notwithstanding, there could still be aspects inherent to
drones that were problematic from a laws-of-war point of view short of this form
of radical illegality.
As we know from the history of the laws of war, it has often proved
particularly problematic to think of any weapon—as opposed to methods of
combat—as having anything inherent about it. After all, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) failed to declare that using nuclear weapons is inherently
incompatible with international humanitarian law in that it is always conceivable

34

Indeed, it may be that the fixation with the means might concede too much to the
paradigm under which it is claimed that the weapons are used.
35
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 33, at 3.
36
Id.
37
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
38
Id.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art.
35(2), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
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that a nuclear weapon could be used in ways that minimize collateral damage.39 It
is also perfectly possible to imagine a conscientious minelayer considerably
limiting the risk of a mine ever harming a civilian. There have long been debates in
the humanitarian community about whether certain weapons are inherently
indiscriminate or inherently cause unnecessary suffering, and the idea is helpful as
a loose marker.40 But whenever there has been agreement about a weapon being
inherently non-humanitarian, it has always been more as a result of a powerful
effort at building an intersubjective consensus to that effect, rather than any logical
demonstration that the weapon in question could only be indiscriminate. For
example, the Ottawa landmines convention was adopted because powerful
arguments were marshaled to the effect that mines were more often indiscriminate
than not, and that this alone should justify a political decision to abolish them; such
an outcome could not simply have been obtained by deduction from the existing
laws of war. This is obviously a familiar debate in the United States where a wellknown and powerful lobby has argued repeatedly that it is “not guns that kill
people, people kill people.” In the same vein, an argument could be made that a
nuclear weapon can be used tactically in a desert to target a military bunker or,
conversely, a sniper’s rifle can be used to shoot randomly in a way that does not
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.
In other words, as we try to shift attention away from actual uses of drones in
particular times and locations, and attempt to have a conversation about what is
inherent to drones, there is a strong risk that we will end up back where we
started—that is, looking at particular uses rather than something that was built into
the weapon. Nonetheless, there may be a middle road between some grand
philosophical claim about weapons having certain inherent features and the
dismissive claim that a discussion on specific weapons is not important at all
because their compliance with international humanitarian law depends on how they
are used. The argument might be, for example, that in the real world, weapons are
not just inert objects that can be understood independently of context, history,
ideology, economy, or politics. For example, nuclear weapons might well be used
tactically in the desert against a strictly military target; in the real world, however,
there are thousands of actual strategic nuclear warheads built historically to
obliterate cities as part of a superpower game of deterrence that has occasionally

39

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 94–95. The
argument was that low yield, tactical nuclear weapons might be used in targets removed
from any civilian population where they would not risk causing collateral damage. In its
defense, the court did nonetheless find that the use of nuclear weapons would be “scarcely
reconcilable” with principles of international humanitarian law. Id.
40
See John Borrie & Rosy Cave, The Humanitarian Effects of Cluster Munitions:
Why Should We Worry?, DISARMAMENT FORUM, no. 4, 2006, at 5; Jack H. McCall, Jr.,
Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate
Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 229 (1994); Virgil Wiebe,
Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under International
Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 85 (2000).
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proved to be extremely unstable.41 Opponents of nuclear weapons can be forgiven
for thinking that that is the main problem, and the fact that some theoretical
tactical nuclear weapons uses do not fit that description should not paralyze all
arguments against them. A similar argument could be made about guns: they might
be used only for hunting, but their history and allure in practice has long associated
them with violent social uses directed at other human beings, and their availability
and ease of use make them natural ingredients of crime.
Even if we do not make an absolutist claim about the inherent nature of
weapons, we can see how certain weapons at least raise ethical and legal
challenges more than others, perhaps because they are begging to be used in a
certain way, or because of a particular potential for lethality. This is what one
might call the “natural slope” of any given weapon. It does not mean that there is
something that is so inscribed in it that a weapon could never be put to a different
use, but that certain weapons have a certain propensity to be used in a certain way
because they were conceived as having a particular purpose and are more broadly
understood as having that particular purpose. In the case of drones, it is of course
possible to imagine drones being used to spread toxic gas over a large territory in a
way that would be fundamentally indiscriminate. Apart from the fact that no such
use has been documented, there is a sense that a drone’s natural slope is an ability
to get very close to enemy targets, at little risk to the operator, and to strike with
high precision. In a sense, this only thickens the mystery, for the ability to
discriminate is surely a characteristic that one would applaud from a humanitarian
point of view.
III. DO DRONES CAUSE DISPROPORTIONATE HARM?
This Article will return to the impact of drones vis-à-vis enemy combatants,
but for the time being the more interesting critique from a humanitarian point of
view is that drones have a strong tendency to cause significant civilian casualties.42
The laws of war prohibit directly targeting civilians in no uncertain terms.43 They
also prohibit the unintentional harming of civilians, unless that harm is
proportionate to the military advantage sought.44 In that context, there has certainly
been great concern about the existence of significant collateral casualties as a result

41

Brian L. Bengs, Legal Constraints Upon the Use of a Tactical Nuclear Weapon
Against the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 323, 384
(2008).
42
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, STANFORD LAW SCH., &
GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH,
INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN, at vi
(2012), available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Stanfo
rd_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf [hereinafter STANFORD & NYU CLINICS’
REPORT].
43
Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, arts. 48, 51.
44
Id. art. 51(5).
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of drone strikes in places like Pakistan.45 The claim that drones cause excessive
collateral harm is intriguing because one would expect them to produce less—or at
least not more than—a host of conventional weapons, including their closest
competitors, planes and missiles. Certainly drones are at the opposite end of the
spectrum from nuclear weapons and other naturally more indiscriminate weapons.
There are few examples of a sustained drone campaign outside the war on
terror, so one is brought back to that particular fact scenario. 46 Despite its
limitations and its specificity, it does reveal several lessons about the nature of
drone warfare. In effect, civilian casualties seem to have been significant in the
absolute, although figures differ wildly from anywhere between a few dozen to
thousands.47 The figures are probably higher than those claimed by those who use
them, if only because of the difficulty of verifying the impact with certainty. The
question of whether they are significant in relative terms is more complex. If
international human rights law were the framework, then the figures would be
considerable because there is not much leeway built into international human
rights law for any civilian casualty (except in the course of police operations or as
a result of self-defense, for example). If the laws of war are the preferred
framework, then we at least have the possibility that not all civilian casualties will
be illegal, because some may have only been hit collaterally. The question is
complicated in the extreme if one tries to reason in aggregate—that is, by looking
at the accumulated number of drone casualties—because the evaluation tends to
get separated from an appreciation of what or who was targeted in each particular
case. There might be a way of weaving the overall number of deaths into a larger
computation of whether the attacker satisfies jus ad bellum proportionality, but that
is bound to be a delicate exercise that will remain distinct from the jus in bello.48 In
45

See STANFORD & NYU CLINICS’ REPORT, supra note 42, at v; Pakistan Drone
Strikes: 2011, NEW AM. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/2
011 (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (identifying between fifty-seven to sixty-five civilian
deaths resulting from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan during 2011).
46
See Domestic Drones Are Already Reshaping U.S. Crime-Fighting, REUTERS (Mar.
3, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-usa-drones-lawenforce
ment-idUSBRE92208W20130303 (discussing drone campaigns used in the United States
for law enforcement purposes).
47
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. & CTR. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS,
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 19–21 (2012); STANFORD & NYU CLINICS’ REPORT, supra note
42, at 153–65; see Pakistan Drone Strikes: 2011, supra note 45.
48
The jus ad bellum has its own proportionality requirement, which anticipates that a
particular use of force should not use more force than is necessary and proportional to
respond to an attack. This is a very broad test that relates to strategic issues and is not
particularly helpful to examine particular humanitarian outcomes, which must at any rate
be assessed on their own terms. Moreover, the jus ad bellum proportionality-satisfying
quality of a drone campaign would have to be evaluated in light of that campaign’s
purpose, but could hardly be a function of the fact that drones were used. See John Forge,
Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 25, 25–28 (2009).
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truth, whether any harm to civilians was proportional needs to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis by looking at the military advantage that was sought in each and
every case and the number of casualties that occurred. That information,
unfortunately, is for the most part unavailable. In the best of cases assessing the
legality of collateral damage has always proved to be an arduous task49 and if
anything it is made harder by the stealth nature of much drone warfare.
Moreover, it is important to note that there may be a significant discrepancy
between the sort of collateral casualties that are tolerated under the laws of war,
and those that ought to be tolerated morally. It is also probably the case that there
is less popular tolerance for the killing of the innocent (particularly women and
children) than is in fact occasionally legal. It may be that the long term prospect of
the laws of war, specifically collateral damage, is grim due to a civilizing process
that makes the public increasingly squeamish about the shedding of any civilian
blood. As an implicit critique of the law’s excessive tolerance for collateral
casualties, this fact is interesting and no doubt partly warranted but this Article will
seek to deal as far as is possible with the law as it is and remains largely
understood to be by its experts and practitioners.
There may also be a certain queasiness about the radical asymmetry of
casualties in asymmetrical warfare today. This Article will return to the question of
the asymmetry of drone warfare between combatants and what it portends for the
laws of war more generally in the final section.50 It is clear, however, that the
asymmetry of asymmetrical war is today manifested nowhere more concretely and
spectacularly than in the radical disproportion of casualties between the dronepossessing and drone-lacking sides to drone warfare—both in terms of combatants
and non-combatants.51 This of course can help us understand how, from a realistic
point of view, the side that does not have access to drones is more likely to make
humanitarian inspired arguments about their unlawfulness or humanitarian
undesirability.
49

See the recent introduction to a special issue of the Journal of International
Criminal Justice on drones. Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 27, 27–29, 43 (2013).
50
See infra Part VI.A.
51
Compare Pakistan Drone Strikes: 2011, supra note 45, with Active Duty Military
Deaths by Year and Manner, DEF. CASUALTY ANALYSIS SYS., https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/
dcas/pages/report_by_year_manner.xhtml (last viewed Aug. 31, 2013) (identifying the
number of active military deaths of U.S. soldiers between 1980 and 2010). There is
material here for a more general critique of collateral casualties: on the one hand, the
technologically superior party may kill thousands in entirely legal ways, while on the other,
the technologically challenged party will often kill very few, and often in ways that are
deemed illegal. See Cronin, supra note 5, at 184–85. This is not the place for such a
critique, however. It should be noted that neither under the jus in bello nor jus ad bellum
proportionality is there any normative requirement that one incur comparable civilian
casualty levels. Indeed, moral theorists also often typically acknowledge the “commonsense morality” that States privilege at least their civilians and even their military over
“enemy civilians.” Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 34, 58–59, 66 (2005).
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Let us assume though that harm to civilians was not just excessive in the
absolute, which in a sense it always is, but also that it was repeatedly excessive
relative to the military advantages sought. This would indeed point to a deeper
problem, but still not necessarily one that can be easily ascribed to drones as such.
If the harm to civilians is excessive as a result of bad training or evil on the part of
those using drones, then the problem is arguably not one of drones but of training
and disciplining those who use drones. In other words, if for example there are
many collateral casualties as a result of a tendency to dehumanize the civilians of
the party to an armed conflict (“enemy civilians”), 52 then this is a relevant
humanitarian fact that tells us that training and discipline should be increased and
appropriate sanctions adopted. But this does not tell us anything very specific
about the weapons used. Similarly, if the argument is that excessive killing resulted
from faulty intelligence, as may well have been the case in Pakistan,53 then that
problem should be addressed on its own terms.54
What is needed is something that specifically links the excessive collateral
casualties to a particular characteristic of drones. It is here that we encounter
arguments that drones might desensitize those using them to the deaths they cause
because of the distance.55 This is a first powerful way of looking at drones that
aims at an arguably inherent characteristic. While the possibility cannot be entirely
discounted, it is probably more relevant to the question of the willingness to use
force—given the decreased risk of causalities for the attacker—than to whether
that force is used in a more or less humanitarian fashion. In fact, operating a drone
from thousands of miles away may mean that one can do so in a room full of
officers and lawyers, which one might expect to at least act as a moderating
influence. As Professor Jack Beard has argued, new virtual technologies are
“creating unprecedented levels of transparency and are unexpectedly making
international law more relevant than ever to armed conflicts.”56 In fact, there may
be a deep affinity between the virtualization of war and its increasing legalization,
as war is increasingly pursued in conditions that allow for the computation of
complex legal equations in real time. Claiming that one did not know that striking
52
This Article will use the expression “enemy civilians” because it is a good
shorthand, although it is a little ambiguous in that it suggests real enmity towards civilians
when international humanitarian law insists that there should be none. By enemy civilians,
therefore, this Article only mean those civilians who have relationships of allegiance to the
opposing party in an armed conflict.
53
Researcher: Most Civilian Drone Deaths ‘From Faulty Information,’ VOICE OF
AM. (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/resaercher-most-civilian-drone-dea
ths-from-faulty-information/1622442.html.
54
The problem of faulty intelligence is not limited to drones. For instance, special
forces could target the wrong person based on faulty intelligence.
55
See Blank, supra note 2, at 701 (“Some critics challenge the growing use of armed
drones, arguing that remote operators are desensitized to the effects of combat and risk
approaching targeting—and killing—as a video game rather than a war with real life-anddeath consequences.”).
56
Beard, supra note 2, at 410.
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a target might lead to collateral casualties will be increasingly difficult given the
abundance of information that real-time drone surveillance provides, not to
mention the digital record of an entire operation that can be scrutinized a posteriori
for traces of a mistake in conditions of increasing transparency.
If anything, the “militainment” phenomena on combatants are better
documented on the actual battlefield, where even in conditions of physical
proximity the virtualization of combat may fuse well with certain psychological
and cultural traits associated with habitual playing of violent video games.57 There
is at least anecdotal evidence that soldiers who have piloted drones have suffered
from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, which suggests that the desensitization of
remote operators is hardly total. 58 Moreover, it is in the nature of militaries to
create a distance, both physical and psychological, between soldiers and their
targets if only for defensive purposes, something which has been evident in most
modern weapons developed in past centuries, from the crossbow to artillery. To
impugn this is not to say anything specific about drones, but merely to note a very
broad trend. As this Article will argue in the next section, there are better
contenders for the idea that drones inherently lead to disproportionate casualties.
In short, what is specifically problematic from a humanitarian point of view
about drones requires quite a few assumptions: (i) that the problem is indeed about
drones and not about something else entirely; (ii) that there is a specifically
humanitarian problem with drones, for example that they cause a particularly high
number of civilian casualties; and (iii) that the humanitarian problem results from
something sufficiently specific about drones that they raise an interesting and at
least somewhat sui generis problem that is not common to a range of other
weapons. The next section will begin to get closer to a case for the moral
peculiarity of drones.
IV. THE PARADOXES OF POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY
There seems to be something that excites the conscience about collateral
casualties resulting from drone attacks, but it is more complicated than the mere
fact of collateral casualties. It can be said with some certainty that drones are in
and of themselves weapons that would seem to lead to more discriminate results
57

See Linda Johansson, Is It Morally Right to Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
in War?, 24 PHIL. & TECH. 279, 285 (2011) (“[O]ne problem with the use of UAVs today
is that the operators may be based on the other side of the globe, making it all dangerously
similar to a computer game.”). See generally Noel Sharkey, Killing Made Easy: From
Joysticks to Politics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ROBOTICS 111 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the role of robots in creating
distance between solders and their enemies and thus reducing the psychological aversion to
killing); Thompson Chengeta, Are U.S. Drone Targeted Killings Within the Confines of
the Law? (Oct. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (assessing the
legality of drone targeted killings).
58
See Elisabeth Bumiller, Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of Stress,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A8.
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not only because they use ammunition that is itself quite precise but because they
allow for long periods of surveillance used to verify intelligence. In contrast to
missile operators, drone operators can wait until literally the last second before
deciding whether to strike. Additionally, drones often operate in conditions of
asymmetry where the attacking party has superior intelligence, control of the
airspace, and has time to decide whether and whom to attack. These characteristics
provide the drone operators with the considerable ability to choose when, where,
and how to strike. This ability is unperturbed by most of the urgencies that would
normally affect the rapid-fire decisions in battle—a unique luxury in the history of
warfare.
The ability to discriminate is also a function of how a certain weapon allows
its users to protect themselves when using the weapon. If a weapon’s ability to
discriminate creates a risk to its operator’s security, then less discriminate
outcomes will be more understandable when it is necessary in the heat of battle to
protect the operator’s safety. For example, it is not hard to see how a sniper rifle is
one of the most precise, and therefore discriminate weapons available. But in many
situations sniping does come with significant risks for the operator, given the
relatively short distance to the target and the risk of being spotted as a result of
firing. Authors such as Professors Jack Beard and Peter Singer have eloquently
made the case that, by contrast, the discriminatory potential of drones is
maximized by the fact that drones protect the life of the operator, thus minimizing
the potential for the usual excuses about soldiers putting their lives on the line.59 In
fact, if there is anything specific and inherent to drones, it is precisely the
humanitarian consequences that flow from drones being unmanned and therefore
almost entirely secure for their operators. Drones, therefore, make it easier for an
attacker to comply with Additional Protocol I obligations to “do everything
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects.”60
A. The Paradox of Precision
Nonetheless, it is here that one encounters what one might describe as the
paradox of precision. It is understandable that mines and nuclear weapons would
engender strong humanitarian opposition, but such opposition is less easy to
fathom when it comes to weapons that have a strong potential to be used
discriminately. Additional Protocol I’s prohibition on collateral casualties is a
general prohibition that is not explicitly connected to the type of weapon used,61
but in practice it is as if weapons that promise more precision also appear to elicit
stronger moral reactions. The paradox, of course, is only apparent. What matters is
not whether weapons are inherently discriminate, which is an impossible
abstraction, but how they are used in relation to their potential for discrimination.
59

See SINGER, supra note 1, at 394–95; Beard, supra note 2, at 430, 443.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
61
See id. arts. 52, 57.
60
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One would therefore expect a relatively more discriminate weapon to be used
relatively more discriminately.62 In other words, even though an ordinary bomb is
less inherently discriminate than a guided missile and is therefore less likely to
curry our humanitarian favor, we would be indignant if a guided missile was used
in such a way that it caused more collateral damage than an ordinary bomb;
inversely, given the same amount of collateral casualties, the more indiscriminate
weapon will incur less condemnation because it will be expected to have been less
capable of producing discriminate results.
This means that while there is probably an absolute baseline for collateral
damage—where the collateral harm is clearly greater than the expected military
advantage or where an attack is, effectively, indiscriminate—the equation is likely
to be sensitive to the means used. One might think of this in terms of a sliding
scale of expectations based on what a particular weapons system allows one to do.
Soldiers using weapons that are more discriminate will inevitably be held, if not to
higher standards, then at least to a more strict application of the same standards.
Drones, in that respect, surely rank high as weapons that one would expect to be
used very discriminately because they have that technological capacity. Hence
there is understandable shock when significant collateral casualties occur as a
result of drones.63 The problem is not necessarily that drones create considerable
collateral casualty, but that they cause more than they should, given their
characteristics. When substantial casualties occur, the suspicion is thus naturally
that a drone could have hovered a little longer to verify data and minimize risks to
civilians. Alternatively, the only logical conclusion may be that the strikes
reflected an anti-humanitarian callousness about collateral damage. In that sense,
the use of drones is more likely to give rise to an inference of violations of the laws
of war and the operator less likely to be given the benefit of the doubt given
drones’ inherently precise baseline.

62

There is at least anecdotal evidence that the demands of humanitarianism have long
been understood to be sensitive to the weapon at stake. For example, one delegate at the
1977 conference that led to the adoption of Additional Protocol I insisted that the
obligation to identify objectives as military “depended to a large extent on the technical
means of detection available to the belligerents.” CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 682 (Yves Sandoz et al., 1987); see also
Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 73, 97–99
(2003).
63
Indeed, civil society has clearly caught on to this dimension, by both praising
drones for their discriminatory potential, yet also insisting that they require greater scrutiny
whenever civilian deaths arise. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRECISELY WRONG: GAZA
CIVILIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI DRONE-LAUNCHED MISSILES 4 (2009).
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B. Differentiated Humanitarian Responsibilities
Nested within the paradox of precision is a moral paradox. The party with the
more advanced technology—which is probably the one that invested more
resources in developing a discriminate weapon’s systems—ends up being held to
higher standards. Indeed, that party might even be liable if it choses to use a less
discriminate weapon when a more discriminate weapon could have reasonably
been deployed in a situation where civilians were at risk—an issue that has been
alive since at least the first Gulf War.64 Conversely, if a party to an armed conflict
only has relatively coarse weapons systems to take out certain targets in a city for
example, then it will be judged by the relative inefficiency of these weapons. One
might question such an outcome on the basis that it puts in question the equality of
belligerents, one of the founding principles of international humanitarian law, 65
and may, therefore, weaken the limitations on collateral damage. It could also lead
to awkward outcomes. What if a country were to be perversely incited to equip
itself with less discriminate weapons, as a result of fears that possession of these
weapons will then be invoked against it to hold it to higher standards?
It is unclear whether this is a realistic possibility given that States have all
kinds of purely military incentives to develop and use precision munitions.
Although it is difficult to see how States might have an interest in causing more
rather than less collateral damage,66 this sort of paradoxical logic bears underlining,
especially given the costs of developing and employing more discriminate
weapons. Still, the risk of a resulting inequality of belligerents is not, as is
traditionally feared, an inequality based on the validity/invalidity, or
justness/unjustness of the cause for which each party is fighting.67 It does not seem
to do any fundamental harm to the tradition of restraint in warfare. For one thing,
simply because a State with more discriminate weapons is held to a higher
standard in terms of ability to achieve reduced collateral damage does not absolve
the other party from any of its obligations under the laws of war. Because drones
are highly precise weapons, it is quite easy to make an argument that they should
be used very discriminately and cause fewer casualties. This may go some way to
explain the intensity of the reaction to drone casualties: public opinions, in
particular, are incensed by what is seen as the difference between a weapon’s
potential for discriminating and its actual discrimination. Certainly one might
64

See generally Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated
Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; but Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision
Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L.
& ECON. 109 (1992) (discussing the use of precision-guided missiles in Operation Desert
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See Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a “Terrorist”? Drawing the Line Between
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expect drone strikes to result in fewer collateral casualties, at least over time, than
similar strikes carried out by conventional aircraft in which protecting the life of
pilots is at the forefront, thus potentially leading to less precision.
V. HOW THE ABSOLUTE SAFETY OF THE OPERATOR MORALLY CHALLENGES THE
LEGALITY OF COLLATERAL CASUALTIES
There is more to drones, however, than their technical ability to discriminate
based on a greater ability to protect the operator’s life. In particular, the safety of
drone operators is not simply a factor that diminishes the potential for States’
excuses, nor is it simply the case that this safety increases the number of measures
that an attacking party can adopt to minimize collateral casualties. It is also the
case that drone warfare will arguably more fundamentally affect the very moral
compact that lies at the heart of the laws of war. In this respect, the arguments of
Professors Beard and Singer can be pushed even further to take into account not
only how drones facilitate compliance with the laws of war but also, potentially,
how they strike at the very nature and content of international humanitarian law.
A. Basis for the Laws of War’s Tolerance of Collateral Casualties
It is necessary at this point to backtrack a little and inquire as to why the laws
of war allow for collateral harm to civilians in the first place. There are two related
reasons why this is conceivably so. The first and most evident is that laws of war
that do not allow for any collateral damage would be laws of war so utopian as to
have very little claim to regulate war. They would effectively, especially in this
day and age, require armies to tread so incredibly carefully as to make the pursuit
of war almost impossible. But the laws of war cannot make war impossible or
undermine their very basis. They cannot, in other words, be another way of
outlawing war, the role traditionally assigned to the jus ad bellum. The recognition
that not all collateral casualties are illegal demonstrates that, in the fog of war,
mistakes are occasionally made and that to criminalize those mistakes—or at least
make them violations of the laws of war—would be unrealistic.68 Humanitarian
lawyers are, in part, pragmatists who know better than to saw the branch on which
they are sitting.
So the possibility of collateral damage must be contemplated, as long as it is
only a risk and not part of a deliberate or callous targeting of civilians. If such
callousness were involved, international humanitarian law would have undermined
itself just as lethally as a humanitarian project intent on saving lives. Indeed, if the
laws of war only justified what States might be naturally inclined to do without
exerting any pressure on them, one might legitimately question whether the laws
were of any use—indeed whether they were international law at all. The
fundamental logic of this intuition is borrowed from Professor Martti
68

See William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7
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Koskenniemi’s more general work on international law and the notion that
international law is forever caught up in an oscillation between apology (defending
state interest) and utopia (protecting some higher societal value) as a result of its
very epistemology and embeddedness in liberal theory. 69 International
humanitarian law is a broad normative system that must preserve a measure of
humanity whilst acknowledging the reality of war. The regime of collateral
damage is perhaps the most crucial safety valve for it to do so.
But the rationale for allowing a measure of collateral casualties goes deeper,
even though the laws of war, in their characteristic prudishness, remain strangely
silent on the matter. In some cases the only way to ensure that there are absolutely
no civilian casualties, apart from ruling out a weapon system, would be to ask
one’s troops to take extra risks themselves. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine
that there would be an absolute prohibition on any civilian casualties. This would
reduce military work to something close to police work—requiring extreme
scrupulousness from the attacker and responsibility towards the other side’s
civilians as if they were the attacker’s own civilians. This would also require that
only conventional troops be sent into hostile territory and only engage, at
considerable risk to themselves, in such conditions of proximity that they would
never mistakenly shoot a civilian. Indeed, the author of this Article has argued
elsewhere that something like that standard may be appropriate when the attacker
explicitly invokes humanitarian motives to go to war and would contradict this
motivation if it did not rise up to the occasion in terms of how that war is waged.70
The problem is that, outside perhaps the exceptional case of humanitarian
intervention, such a position would be even more utopian and unlikely to find
many adherents. 71 It would essentially presume that we no longer live in an
international world where significantly different obligations exist for States (and
their agents) towards their own soldiers on the one hand, and towards “civilians”
on the other, most notably enemy civilians. Many reasons can be given as to why
States owe morally defensible duties of protection to their own military and cannot,
for the most part, ask them lightly to sacrifice themselves for the good of foreign
civilians.72 If nothing else, safeguarding the life and integrity of the attackers is
surely part of the military advantage that one aims to obtain from an attack,
especially in a context where the death or capture of even one pilot may have a
considerable military and political impact.73 States can at best ask their service
69
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members to take reasonable risks to minimize civilian casualties when such risks
are the only way that an armed attack would not create a manifestly
disproportional risk to civilians from the beginning. But it is most unclear from an
international law point of view that much more can be required.74 This means that
certain attacks should not be engaged in because they create too much risk for
civilians as a result of being intrinsically indiscriminate (and therefore manifestly
disproportional). But within the range of attacks that do intend to discriminate, a
State’s soldiers cannot be forced to engage in a form of “humanitarian heroism” to
further reduce the risk.75
So at a deeper level the recognition of the inevitability of collateral civilian
casualties acknowledges that there is some kind of tradeoff between the lives of
one State’s soldiers and another State’s civilians,76 leading Professor David Luban
to note that “[i]f ever there was an appropriate use of the overworked phrase
‘existential dilemma,’ this is it.” 77 The issue emerged perhaps most
characteristically in the context of the NATO bombing of the Republic of
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo campaign. There was substantial criticism of
NATO’s “humanitarian war” 78 —perhaps especially due to the humanitarian
motive invoked. Indeed, one might object on moral grounds to the idea that
soldiers are “ready to kill but not to die”79 in a post-heroic age (or at least one in
which the parameters of heroism have been narrowly defined to cover only force
and mission protection). One might also deplore the zero-casualty doctrine in that
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it weakens the moral texture of war,80 perhaps by so dramatizing the stakes of the
internal jus in bello (obligations owed to one’s own combatants) as to nullify the
provisions of the external jus in bello (obligations owed to non-combatants). 81
Some have argued that a moral warrior should, in certain conditions, be willing to
take more risks to himself to minimize non-combatant casualties. 82 Yet from a
legal perspective, when the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) reviewed the NATO campaign against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), it could not avoid characteristically asking itself:
“To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces to
danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?”83 The
implicit answer, given the lack of investigations of NATO soldiers, seemed to be:
not a great deal and the issue is potentially so fraught and complex as not to justify
the expense of significant prosecutorial resources. The ICTY could never conclude
that NATO bombings of the FRY were illegal despite being launched from
altitudes that would affect pilots’ ability to discriminate because the weapons they
used seemed to be quite discriminate.84
The desire to not expose one’s troops to undue risk could not go so far as to
result in attacks launched from such conditions of safety that they inevitably result
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See Yagil Levy, The Tradeoff Between Force and Casualties: Israel’s Wars in
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82
COOK, supra note 75, at 117–28.
83
INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO., FINAL REPORT TO THE
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, para. 49 (2000), reprinted
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Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV 81, 85–91
(2006) (analyzing “armies’ duties towards enemy civilians during hostilities under the
principle of human dignity”). This Article does not discount these possibilities entirely and
shall return to them later to examine how the particular circumstances of drone warfare and
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in being fundamentally indiscriminate.85 As has been seen, in the same way that
the laws of war will collapse as a result of being excessively utopian, international
humanitarian law will implode as a result of being too apologetic. At best, the laws
of war may impose what might be described as a duty of moderate fortitude, one
that involves taking some risks to the mission rather than to one’s life, or not
engaging in a mission at all, which is always at least theoretically an option.
But it will forever be difficult, within the categories of positive international
humanitarian law (as opposed to moral and ethical thoughts on the scope of
desirable duties to civilians), 86 to argue that this sort of tradeoff ought to be
strongly or systematically resolved in a way that ends up sacrificing one’s troops
for some greater humanitarian good. In all likelihood, when it comes to one’s
combatants, there may even be an ethical obligation to use drones when available
rather than risk one’s troops if the State has the ability to do so.87 Within the fairly
considerable margin opened up by Additional Protocol I in terms of collateral
damage, as long as an attack is not fundamentally indiscriminate, there is
considerable margin for an attacker to minimize risk to himself—essentially at the
expense of civilians who happen to be a little too close to a target.88
B. How Drone Warfare Affects the Basis for the Laws of War’s Tolerance of
Collateral Casualties
It is these assumptions that drone warfare arguably fundamentally challenges.
All of the above—namely the understanding that collateral casualties will occur
because absolutely minimizing them would involve at least some significant risk to
the attacker—apply so long as there is effectively a tradeoff between the attacking
military’s lives and those of civilians. But if a weapon can discriminate in
conditions of absolute safety for its manipulator (i.e., if the marginal cost of
discrimination is very weak to nonexistent) then one would have correspondingly
little understanding for that discriminatory capability not being maximized. A
drone might be relatively less discriminatory than an infiltrated sniper, but what it
loses in terms of discriminatory potential it would arguably more than gain in
terms of sheer lack of risk to the human operator. It is here that the nature of the
dilemma changes fundamentally and we enter a normative terrain that is quite
unique to this unprecedented era of distance warfare. As Professor Kahn puts it,
85
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“the drone is the technological equivalent of the assassin: it does the assassin’s
work but without the risk of personal presence.”89
Drones potentially introduce a largely new dimension in that they are perhaps
the first weapons system to be both highly discriminating and highly—almost
entirely, in fact—safe for their users.90 In other words, drones strongly attenuate
the very tradeoff that was so problematic in the implementation of the laws of war
between getting closer and taking greater risks to oneself or shooting from a
distance and offloading risks onto the enemy civilian population. To use the
terminology of Professor David Luban, drones offer the benefits of the collateral
casualty minimizing scenario known as Close Engagement and the safety
maximizing scenario of Distant Engagement. 91 This will then inevitably show
collateral casualties and damage as a result of drone strikes in a very different light
because such casualties will be seen as having occurred despite a drone’s precise
targeting potential and ability to protect the operator’s life. The terms of the
equation will therefore surely change radically because one is no longer comparing
similar or at least commensurable things (i.e., lives versus lives) but life on the one
hand (of the non-combatants) and military or material goals on the other. A State
can no longer claim that to preserve the other side’s civilian lives it would need to
take considerable risk to its soldiers’ lives—the argument that was typically heard
in the context of the NATO bombing of Serbia and that is so perplexing for the
laws of war.92
Under those conditions, it will be disingenuous to claim the benefit of
collateral damage that is legally tolerated under Additional Protocol I in conditions
that do not approximate the factual and normative scenario historically
contemplated when Protocol I was adopted. It may be even more disingenuous in a
context where there is already a lingering suspicion that armies only too willingly
abuse the “collateral damage exception.”93 It is not just the case, therefore, that
drone warfare allows greater compliance with the laws of war; it also exposes, at
least in its traditional form, the laws of war’s continued imbrication with violence
and their increasingly outdated character. It is almost as if toleration for collateral
harm were becoming anachronistic given the ability to avoid it. Even as the
positive law remains what it is through typical sociolegal inertia,94 it is inevitable
that the kind of compromise the laws of war struck historically between the
principle of military necessity and that of humanity will be reassessed in light of
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radically changing technological conditions, and how those conditions interfere
with the underlying moral substratum of war’s regulation.
Several caveats need to be added to this broad brush. First, considering the
added capabilities that drone warfare provides, there remains the possibility that an
opportunity to strike a very significant military target will arise that is unique and
commands a measure of risk-taking vis-à-vis civilians. In other words, drones
greatly augment the ability to strike at military targets without hitting civilians, but
they cannot eliminate that risk altogether. There may be military opportunity costs
involved in a decision to not strike at a certain point that require a rapid reaction
because it is possible that the combatants will become unreachable afterwards. If
any risk were involved to civilians, presumably the military advantage would have
to be considerable. Second, the added capability of drones cannot do much about
otherwise lawful targets that surround themselves with civilians, thus maximizing
the risk to the attacker of causing collateral casualties. Even if the attacker is not
relieved of his responsibilities under the laws of war because the other party is
itself in violation, there may be cases where the attacked party’s systematic
endangerment of civilians effectively limits what drones can do. In that case,
drones may not have any significant advantage over conventional weapons. Third,
one must take into account the risk that, in trying to minimize civilian casualties, a
drone will get too close or hover for too long and will be shot down. Although
drones all but eliminate the danger to combatants using them, they obviously
replace combatants with a valuable piece of military equipment. One commentator
has pointed out that “it doesn’t even really matter if the drone crashes.” 95 Yet
losing a drone to enemy fire might not be a small loss in terms of military
advantage—not simply because of the economic cost of drones, but in some
circumstances because actors on the ground may have the ability to derive some
technological or intelligence—not to mention propaganda—benefit from the drone.
VI. DRONE WAR AS NOT-WAR?
A. Drones, Radical Asymmetry and the End of “Battle”
Beyond the way in which drones redefine the boundaries of acceptable
collateral damage lies an arguably deeper and more troubling issue that challenges
the humanitarian edifice altogether. It is of course possible to imagine drones being
used by two regular armies on something resembling a conventional battlefield,
and the future may yield just such a development. But there does seem to be a
natural affinity between drones and asymmetrical warfare, in that drones are
particularly appropriate when deployed against a low-tech enemy with little or no
air defense capability.96 In effect, “killing” drones have mostly been deployed in
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contexts where only one side had them. 97 They tend to further reinforce the
asymmetry of otherwise already asymmetrical conflicts. States, even though they
have widely divergent means, have somewhat similar broad organizational and
industrial capabilities; nonstate actors on the other hand are typically at a
considerable disadvantage in terms of technology development (except, precisely,
when they have State support). Drones and robots in this context radicalize
asymmetry by ultimately destroying the element of danger to one side and
increasing it to stratospheric heights for the other. They transform the drone
makers and operators into demigods rather than combatants, who can decide who
lives and who dies. Those on the receiving side of drones have few defensive
options if any, except to go into more or less permanent hiding.
As this Article has previously hinted, acquiring such an extreme advantage is
arguably part of any warring faction’s long-term aspiration in war. The whole
history of war could be retold as an effort to make it easier and less risky for one’s
side to inflict violence, and surely it is hard in principle to make a case against
soldiers better shielding themselves. 98 Yet paradoxically, this ultimate and
unexpected success in the mastery over the course of war may be paid in practice
by the demise of the very activity over which it was supposed to gain the upper
hand. Indeed, perhaps the strongest point that can be made about why drone
warfare is normatively problematic, at least in the conditions of radical asymmetry
in which it has so far been typically practiced, is that it creates such a wide chasm
between those who have drones and those who do not that it destroys the idea of
war as a contest that, while potentially uneven, is essentially still a contest between
(humanitarian) equals, indeed a contest tout court. This idea of “war as contest” is
in a sense the unformulated assumption of the laws of war—an idea that one would
struggle to find in the Geneva Conventions,99 but which historically undergirds the
entire idea of warfare. It is on the basis that both sides can harm the other’s
combatants (and incidentally, its non-combatants) that a sort of historical
understanding has evolved that each side can protect itself from that harm in selfdefense.100 The assumption, some would even say the “bond of mutual risk,”101
therefore is a powerful element in minimally socializing what is otherwise a human
activity premised on the breakdown of ordinary social relations.
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Accordingly, drone warfare threatens to change the entire sociocultural
experience of warfare, and sooner or later, the laws that take their cue from and
purport to govern it. The use of drones in a context where only one side has access
to that far superior technology renders war essentially meaningless as a concept.
Rather, drone attacks become more like a continuous, one-sided imposition of
violence in which one side pays with their lives and limbs, whilst the other side
pays, at best, with economic costs. As one commentator once put it, “Here war
sheds all features of the classical duel situation and, to put it cynically,
approximates certain kinds of pest control.” 102 But “a conflict devoid of any
physical risk falls outside the parameters of the moral reasoning that sustains the
law of armed conflict.”103 As a result, there is theoretically no escaping the fact
that the real humanitarian cost of drone warfare is in terms of the irremediable
normative breakdown of what it means to be at war, and the corollary
understanding that war has moral bounds. This is a point made most compellingly
by Professor Paul Kahn:
If the fundamental principle of the morality of warfare is a right to
exercise self-defense within the conditions of mutual imposition of risk,
then the emergence of asymmetrical warfare represents a deep challenge.
A regime capable of targeting and destroying others with the push of a
button, with no human intervention but only the operation of the ultimate
high tech weapon, propels us well beyond the ethics of warfare. Such a
deployment of force might be morally justified—it might be used to
promote morally appropriate ends—but we cannot appeal to the morality
of warfare to justify this mode of combat.104
One of the ensuing dangers for the laws of war has sometimes been expressed
as that the “replacement of humans by virtual combatants and the corresponding
lack of concern about the death or capture of military personnel could even
challenge two conditions seen by some as limiting the willingness of States to
comply with and enforce their law-of-war obligations in conflicts with terrorists:
reciprocity and symmetry.” 105 The collapse of reciprocity and symmetry has an
impact on the laws of war, but it is not principally, and perhaps not at all, on the
State that has access to “virtual combatants.” After all, that State has managed to
seamlessly combine maximum military efficiency and humanitarianism,
potentially bringing about, perhaps for the first time in history, a fusion of what
were thought to be the polarizing principles of the Law of Armed Conflict:
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necessity and humanity. 106 If anything, the side that has absolute risk-free
superiority should endorse even higher humanitarian obligations,107 and may well
be inclined to do so for various self-interested strategic reasons.
The problem lies more, if anything, with how this spectacle will affect the
ability and willingness of the other side108 to engage with the laws of war. If one is
not “at war” but merely engaged in a continuous campaign of killing one’s
enemies, wherever they may be, then it will be all the more difficult to convince
the other side, or for some impartial and neutral actor to convince them, that we are
indeed in a regulated activity that they should participate in. There will be, as it
were, nothing in it for them. For the most part, there will be no laws of war for
them to respect since they will never see the enemy and even if they managed to
down a drone by extraordinary chance, they can inflict very little pain on the other
side. Now it may be that the enemy is more interested in simply terrorizing
civilians and not in waging war in the first place, in which case drones will be an
equally abrupt response. In that case, the side that uses the drones is not interested
in engaging in war because it sees the “other” as a threat that is perhaps altogether
beyond the law. Drones will simply be the last nail in war’s coffin.
But it may also be that drones will lose any prospect of war-like engagement
with parties that might otherwise have been interested in fighting a battle according
to the laws of war. There is, symbolically, an extraordinarily dehumanizing aspect
to drone warfare in that it deprives its targets from ever even being able to engage
in a humanitarian gesture that would manifest their good will and constitute them
as moral agents of war. Enormous disproportion in means will inevitably
encourage the weaker party to compensate what it does not have in terms of
technological might by skirting the rules. We have been there before with wars of
national liberation in the 1960s and ‘70s.109 The adoption of Additional Protocol I
seemed to implicitly acknowledge that for the normative enterprise to be
sustainable, the weaker party in asymmetrical warfare must be able to escape some
of the strictures of the laws of war.110 High-tech warfare is now threatening to
106
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make even guerilla warfare of the traditional kind impossible, leaving few outlets
for legal or quasi-legal violence for nonstate actors.
After a while, it may become difficult to determine whether drone warfare is
merely a response to the battlefield evading tactics of the “terrorist,” or whether it
is not also a cause of the combatants deserting the battlefield in the first place. In
all likelihood, both are part of a self-reinforcing symbiotic loop that sees both sides
symbolically and effectively abandoning the battlefield. In fact, drone warfare can
be seen as the powerful and technologically sophisticated version of the
asymmetric warfare tactics of the weak. It, therefore, awkwardly shares something
of the ethos of avoidance that it despises in the enemy, even though it does so
legally (by maximizing its technological advantage) where the other side does so
illegally (by avoiding conventional battle although increasingly, there is no
conventional battle to be found). It may also reveal an uncomfortable truth, in that
over time the laws of war privilege the powerful by sanctifying their military
technological prowess as more conducive to a humanitarian outcome. Additionally,
it purports to lock the technologically challenged party in a confrontation that it is
sure to lose.111
B. The “Putting Up a Fair Fight” and the “Decline of War” Arguments
Distinguished
Note that this point is different from the suggestion that the technologically
superior army should take greater risk and fight on the battlefield. There is
certainly no normative principle that says one ought to “expose oneself to a good
fight,” and refrain from killing enemies at no risk to oneself even though one can.
Perfidy in the laws of war only covers situations where one masquerades as a
“friendly,” for example, obviously not situations where one is merely trying to
maximize defense through distance or camouflage. As Professor Laurie Blank put
it, “The law of armed conflict—or international humanitarian law (whichever you
prefer)—does not require a ‘fair fight’. Rather, it requires that each side ‘fight
fairly.’” 112 The chivalry route is therefore likely the wrong way to address the
problem from a legal point of view. It thrives on an ethos that is a little passé,
O’Driscoll, A ‘Fighting Chance’ or Fighting Dirty? Irregular Warfare, Michael Gross and
the Spartans, 11 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 113 (2012).
111
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especially when applied between combatants. Additionally, it is based on an
assumption of common professional code beyond enmity that is largely absent in
today’s asymmetrical warfare and which we may have reason to be morally wary
of as it historically sidelined civilians.
The point is precisely that the superior party cannot be asked to change
anything it is doing from within the tradition of the laws of war. This does not
mean, however, that the argument about the unfairness of drone war is entirely
beside the point. Rather, it suggests a difference between behavior that is in
violation of the laws of war and behavior that, whilst entirely legal, might be said
to be more generally destructive of the laws of war through the disabling of the
sort of implicit assumptions within which war is embedded. These are two
different notions and failure to distinguish them risks obscuring the debate. The
point about drones, then, is not that their use is illegal but that their use belies the
relevance of a model of violence historically incarnated by the idea of war, which
is quite a different argument.
A useful analogy is one that the author of this Article has explored elsewhere
between the laws of war and sports.113 There is obviously a difference between
violating the rules of a sport and achieving such crushing superiority in the sport
that the opponent not only loses their taste for the game, but the game in fact
becomes no game at all. So imagine, for the sake of illustration, a game of tennis in
which an average player is pitted against Roger Federer. In addition, Federer uses a
top-notch, state of the art racket, whilst the average player has to use a 1930s-style
wooden racket. There is of course no obligation for Federer to concede an easy
point to the opposite player, even though we might think it would be nice for him
to do so. Moreover, we would certainly not argue that Federer winning in three
straight sets without losing a single point was in violation of the rules of tennis. By
the same token, we might understand if the other player decided this was not a
psychologically or existentially interesting practice for him to engage in and quit
the game entirely, perhaps looking for an alternative game to play. Furthermore,
we might do the same, leaving a mindless show that had none of the attributes of
what makes a game interesting and worth watching.
Now of course one of the many differences between tennis and war is that the
former is played on the basis of consent, whereas the latter is played whether a
participant wants to or not on the basis of the existence of a particular real world
configuration (i.e., an armed conflict). So in a sense, those who refuse to “play the
game they will forever lose” are not entitled to withdraw from a conflict under the
laws of war in the way one could pull out of a game that one had lost taste for.
Nonetheless, in the real world we must understand that the willingness of actors to
play by the rules of war cannot be taken for granted, either because nonstate actors
are not actively involved in the development of those rules and invested in their
existence, or more generally, because they feel that they stand to lose more from
playing that particular game. If anything the applicability of those particular rules
113
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may be what is at stake, something quite evident in the context of the War on
Terror.
VII. NOVELTY OR CONTINUITY? THE LAWS OF WAR AND EXOGENOUS
TECHNOLOGICAL SHOCKS
The irony is that mastering a way of waging war that is eminently legal ends
up being the death knell of the laws of war—at least as we know them. This is so
not because it may relatively safeguard civilians, 114 but because that ability is
gained through such military superiority that any sense of a contest dissipates from
war. There is a deeper lesson in this for the laws of war, which run the risk of
creating incentives for technological developments that in turn undermine its core
model. As Charles Kels has argued, “A corollary to the incongruity of riskless
warfare is to query whether the ensuing breakdown of ethical and legal norms
unwittingly encourages the very instability that the law of war attempts to control,
thereby endangering the civilian populations of all parties to the conflict.”115
One way of looking at these developments in the broader perspective is
through an examination of similar historical precedents to the development of
drones. One might look at the problem as one of exogenous technological shocks
affecting the normative system that is international humanitarian law. Because the
very goal of war is to attain superiority over one’s enemies, it is only natural that
from a military standpoint armies will seek to develop superior weapons. Every
now and then, however, a game-changing technology will come into play that
creates such an asymmetry that it will lastingly put the laws of war off keel.
A classic example is the invention of the crossbow, which conferred a very
considerable military advantage to those troops that mastered its art; another
example is the onset of modern aviation and the possibility, only just barely
contemplated toward the end of World War I, of aerial bombardment. In both cases,
an attempt was made to reinstate the laws of war’s broad symmetry by trying to
outlaw the weapon. In the case of the crossbow, Pope Innocent II famously
pronounced it to be “hateful to God and unfit for Christians”;116 in the case of
aerial bombardment, a Commission of Jurists was set up as part of the 1921
Washington Conference on the Limitations of Armaments, which adopted a fairly
restrictive code for aerial warfare.117 It is no surprise that calls to severely regulate
or perhaps even outlaw certain means and methods of combat were at their
strongest in conditions of technological asymmetry, that is, when one side—the
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side that mastered the technology—stood to suffer disproportionally from such
regulation.
The attempts at regulating both the crossbow and aerial bombardment were
almost unmitigated catastrophes.118 In the case of the crossbow, the weapon was
first only prohibited between Christians, allowing crusaders to use it at will against
the Saracens. But it was quickly used between Christian nations as well, ultimately
showing that a technological advance such as this was too precious to be
relinquished against real foes. 119 The Washington Conference never led to a
convention and was essentially a fiasco.120 In both cases, it seems, the normative
effort was suspected of unduly reining in technological progress under a
humanitarian guise. These efforts did not add much to what could be distilled from
general principles of the laws of war and unduly restricted States’ abilities to
develop a military advantage. If the precedents of the crossbow, aerial
bombardment and colonial warfare are any indication, then one would think that
efforts to regulate drone warfare would be headed the same way because it simply
beggars belief to think that parties who have such an edge would voluntarily limit,
let alone relinquish, their advantage.
Beyond mere differentials in technology, it seems that what is at stake is
something deeper relating to the very structuration of war as a social activity and
the ability to define it. It should come as no surprise in this respect that the
normative register of the crossbow mapped a not so subtle civilizational divide.
Ultimately the question was not whether the crossbow was inherently unlawful,
but against whom it was inherently unlawful and against whom it might be used.
Similarly when it came to the 19th century laws of war the question was as much
what the laws should regulate as whom they should apply to, and especially,
against.121 Aerial bombardment of civilians, as well as the use of gas against them,
was pioneered in the deserts of Abyssinia. Whether it be the Saracens or
“savages,” it was the presumed unwillingness or inability to respect the laws of
war that justified the use of extraordinary techniques that the West claimed to shun
normatively in its midst (although obviously not necessarily in actual fact). As
Professor Sam Moyn puts it, there is arguably “a continuum, not a break, between
the aesthetics, subjectivity, and morality of colonial warfare and its successors
today, including in drone campaigns.”122 In that respect, drones are less a radical
novelty than specifically a continuation of the tradition by which the laws of war
both include and exclude, socialize and desocialize into international society.
Arguably, however, drone warfare marks less an attempt to push certain types
of warfare beyond the law, than it is an effort to draw on the law for strategic gain.
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The argument for drone use is very much formulated as an argument for legal
drone use because the law is largely perceived as enabling the sort of use of force
that the US in particular has in mind rather than constraining it, precisely because
drones seem both highly effective and highly humanitarian. Drone use, in other
words, is not really about invoking the “exception” of warfare against terrorism but
about insisting that one can wage war even against a foe that is intent on not doing
so. As Professor Moyn argues, “it is not the loss of ‘classic interstate war’ as a real
or imagined paradigm but the application of old and new humanitarian norms born
in it to continuing irregular war that may mark the fundamental novelty.” 123
Insisting on the need to continue to respect the laws of war is, paradoxically, one
of the ways in which one can show that the other side is unworthy of them even as
one continues to benefit from their considerable legitimization of the use of force.
In this context, three scenarios for the future of warfare-as-defined-byasymmetrical-drone-use seem plausible. The first is that, failing to level off with
their more powerful technological adversaries, groups that have limited access to
drone technology will be pushed even further into a rejection of the conventional
warfare model. War would thus cease to be pertinent as a basic scenario for the
bilateral use of violence, or would at least become unrecognizable through
persistent subtraction of at least one purported player in the “game.” The second
scenario is of course the one that proved most pertinent in the context of the
crossbow and aerial bombardment, namely that most armies rushed to develop a
similar capability in a way that might not ensure victory but at least “rescued” war
from becoming an entirely one-sided killing enterprise and therefore a normative
investment that the other side had no interest in making. In this scenario, it is
technological diffusion and relative homogenization that saves the laws of war’s
regulatory potential. As I have hinted, even though drone warfare is currently the
weapon of choice of asymmetrical warfare, it may well be that this is merely a
transitory phase and that drones, rather than heralding or at least symbolizing a
new type of warfare, will merely be “digested” by various existing modes of
institutional violence.
The third scenario, perhaps the most relevant, is that we are in what may be a
long period of transition in which drones continue to shape warfare in a very
asymmetrical direction, but in which various normative options offer themselves at
least to the party that has drones and must make sense of its superiority. At one end
of the spectrum, the use of drones may inaugurate the dismantling of restraints on
war through a realization that there is no legitimate “adversary,” no one on the
other side still capable or willing of engaging the drone manipulators on their
terms. This might then give rise, rather somberly, to a view of “statecraft, as the
administration of death,” a “high-tech form of a regime of disappearance” whose
inspiration is Machiavelli124 and in which the killing power will take advantage of
the fact that it is neither in a situation of war nor in a situation where human rights
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obligations are owed. In many ways, this has been the preferred route of the war on
terror in the last decade.
At the other end of the spectrum, the more technologically endowed party
could continue to seek to wage war even against parties that were committed not to
wage “war” against it, effectively applying a sort of unilateral laws of war and
reinforcing the notion that asymmetrical norms must correspond to asymmetrical
conflicts. Perhaps, then, the application of sui generis rules, somewhere at the
intersection of the laws of war and international human rights law, might make
most sense with regards to the evolving challenges of drone warfare—one in which
the heightened capacity of the attacker and his ability to “wage war without really
waging one” is matched by an added scruple in terms of safeguarding civilian
lives.125 Drone warfare might be seen as a bizarre synthesis of war-making and
policing,126 requiring a new historical compromise between law and morality. It
would conceptualize drone fighting as part of a body of norms rooted less in
expectations of reciprocity or in some fundamental obligation owed to those
targeted as human beings, than in a sense that with immense power must come
heightened responsibilities. Although this path might still be associated with a sort
of “exit” from war in that it seems to burden the technologically superior side with
obligations that it cannot expect the asymmetrically disadvantaged side to
reciprocate, it could also be understood as maintaining the very ethos of war by
keeping alive a sense of drone operators’ military self-worth and human dignity as
a particular way of ethically living up to one’s potential for death and
destruction.127
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to explore whether drones raise a specific
humanitarian issue, that is, one not raised in similar fashion by other existing
weapons. It has sought to cautiously advance an argument that many of the
worrying aspects of drones are either not humanitarian or are not specific to drones.
This does not discount the importance of the issues that arise, but simply sets them
apart from the limited ambitions of the Article. Although shunning any strong
claim about the inherent character of any weapon, including drones, this Article
has argued that weapons do not exist in the abstract and in practice almost always
have to be understood against the background of certain assumptions about their
typical use. Drones may cause significant collateral casualties, but how significant
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is a vexed issue from the perspective of the laws of war. The more interesting point
seems to be that, regardless of the answer to the previous question, drone casualties
often appear unnecessary or disproportional. This Article argues that this is less
because of the absolute or relative numbers of such casualties than because of the
particular expectations that surround drones. Drones are not only potentially highly
discriminating weapons; they are also, uniquely in the history of warfare,
immensely safe weapons for their users. This creates an expectation that they will
be used in ways that are highly protective of civilian life because they can.
Beyond changing the ability of a party to comply with the laws of war, this
Article has argued that drones influence the delicate balance between the principles
of necessity and humanity and forces us to reexamine assumptions about the
permissibility of collateral casualties. The possibility of collateral casualties was
always contemplated not just because accidents happen, but because of an implicit
understanding that there is a tradeoff between the attacker’s security and that of
civilians in the vicinity of military targets. This has spurred considerable reflection
about how far soldiers should be willing to go to put their lives on the line in an
effort to minimize civilian casualties, which from a legal point of view typically
receives a fairly conservative answer (i.e., there is very little obligation to sacrifice
oneself for a greater humanitarian good). However, now that the attacker is in
some cases virtually risk free, new questions are bound to arise about the
humanitarian tolerance of collateral casualties. The better view, this Article has
argued, is that this change in the technological circumstances of war should have
an effect in the direction of greatly reducing the tolerance for collateral casualties.
This may already be the public’s perception even though the law itself is somewhat
slow to follow, perhaps because drone-detaining powers are keen to have their
cake and eat it too—that is, they want both a technology that should really allow
the quasi elimination of collateral casualties and the law’s continued tolerance for
such casualties. Nonetheless, in continued conditions of technological asymmetry
one might expect the laws of war themselves (or the “laws of drone use” as
something distinct) to also evolve along asymmetrical lines. The risk otherwise is
that war will become so lopsided a social activity that the weaker party will have
very little incentive to participate in it, let alone comply with the laws governing it;
indeed, the risk is that the idea of war as a particular form of regulated social
violence will become obsolete and misleading. Rather than seek a return to war as
it was (or is imagined as having been), drones may offer an opportunity to reflect
on the paths that should be taken to regulate overwhelmingly dominant force in
conditions where it has marginalized much of what made war historically and
normatively relevant.

